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he assignment of voting weights to the member states in the Council has always been 
an extremely contentious issue. In the past, each treaty reform (and on occasion the 
accession treaties themselves) had to reallocate the votes assigned to each country and 
establish a new threshold for the qualified majority in the Council, in order to account for the 
arrival of new members and significant changes in the population of member states. As such, 
they were also the subject of protracted negotiations in the European Convention in 2002-03. 
The establishment of a new voting system based on a double majority of the member states 
and the population even threatened the conclusion of the constitutional treaty, which was 
eventually concluded but failed in the ratification process. During the negotiations of the 
subsequent Lisbon treaty, confrontation around the double majority system was still palpable. 
Procuring the agreement of the reluctant member states was only possible after the thresholds 
were increased and the application of the new rules was delayed to November 2014 on paper, 
and to April 2017 in practice.  
The new QMV system will do away with the protracted negotiations to reallocate voting 
weights among member states and to redefine the new thresholds accordingly. But whether it 
will substantially improve democratic legitimacy and efficiency in the Council as intended is 
a more controversial issue.  
According to Article 16 TEU, the Council acts as a general rule by qualified majority voting 
(QMV), except where the treaties provide otherwise.1 As from 1 November 2014, the qualified 
majority is reached with the support of at least 55% of the member states (16 at the EU’s present 
size) accounting for 65% of the total EU population. 2 A blocking minority can be formed by at 
                                                   
1 The Lisbon treaty extended the use of the QMV to most policy areas and unanimity is now mainly 
confined to the CFSP, combatting discrimination, social security and social protection, own resources, 
the multiannual financial framework, taxation, fiscal provisions in environment and energy, and a few 
issues within the domain of Justice and Home Affairs. The latter consist primarily of measures 
concerning passports, identity cards and residence permits, family law, the identification of areas of 
crime for judicial cooperation, operational policy cooperation and cross-border operations. 
2 The population figures and the percentages they represent as a share of the total, which are currently 
used to calculate QMV, are laid down in Annex III of the Council’s Rules of Procedure (see Council 
Decision 2014/692/EU). A Council decision taken in January of every year will update these figures on 
T
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least four member states representing at least 35% of the EU’s population or by 13 member 
states. 
The new rules benefit the five larger member states, and, in particular, Germany, France, the 
UK and Italy. These four countries account for around 53% of the EU population (or 82% of 
the sufficient majority), whereas under the Nice rules they accounted for 33% of the total votes 
(around 45% of the threshold of 260 votes).3 In particular, Germany has almost doubled its 
weight. With the exception of Spain, which also improves slightly, the other member states are 
all worse off. Their share of EU population is lower now than their share of the total votes in 
the old system. For most of them, it will become more difficult to form either winning 
majorities or blocking minorities based on the population threshold. The total number of 
member states required to form a winning coalition has increased from 50% to 55%, that is, 
from 15 to 16 member states in the EU-28, which lowers the blocking minority threshold from 
14 to 13 member states. But this only offers a tiny compensation for small member states.  
Assigning a stronger weight to population is meant to enhance democratic legitimacy by 
making the decisions taken more representative. The grounds for the argument are weakened, 
however, if one looks upon the Council as an upper chamber or a Senate that represents EU 
member states – in contrast to the European Parliament, which is intended to embody the 
principle of one man, one vote. But the new voting system in the Council further reinforces 
the weight of the larger member states, thereby increasing the divergences in the 
representation of member states. It is true that the Council is not a usual second legislative 
chamber and it also exercises many executive powers. And nor is the allocation of seats in the 
EP proportional to member states’ populations, with small member states being largely 
overrepresented. Nevertheless, all these considerations and nuances should be taken into 
account when assessing the contribution of the new voting system to democratic legitimacy in 
the EU.  
The contribution of the new system to efficient decision-making in the Council is also 
uncertain. The double majority is supposed to improve the capacity to form winning 
minorities, which should speed up the process and reduce the amount of trade-offs necessary 
to draw in supporters. But the number of states required to form a blocking minority has been 
reduced. The impact on the negotiations might be marginal as well because it is in the long-
term interest of the representatives of the member states to accommodate the others’ demands, 
even when the formal rules do not compel such an accommodation. Even after reaching a 
sufficient majority, it is not unusual for the presidency to continue its efforts to widen the 
agreement and that those in minority will try to secure some concessions rather than vote 
against.  
Therefore, it is uncertain whether the new system will have any substantial impact on the time 
required and the number of decisions taken or in the amount of concessions and trade-offs 
made. This is even more the case since the Lisbon Treaty preserved the so-called ‘Ioannina 
compromise.4 The Council decision approved in Declaration 7 attached to the treaty provides 
that, from 1 November 2014 to 31 March 2017, if members of the Council, representing a) at 
least three-quarters of the population or b) at least three-quarters of the number of member 
                                                   
the basis of the data available to the Statistical Office of the European Union on September 30th of the 
preceding year. 
3 When Croatia joined the EU, the accession treaty gave the new member state seven votes and increased 
the QMV threshold from 255 to 260.  
4 The Ioannina compromise, named after an informal meeting of foreign ministers in the Greek city of 
Ioannina on 29 March 1994, laid down the principles to apply the QMV after the accession of the EFTA 
countries.  
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states necessary to constitute a blocking minority, indicate their opposition to the Council 
adopting an act by a qualified majority, the Council should continue discussing the issue and 
the President of the Council in cooperation with the Commission should do all in its power to 
reach a satisfactory solution to address the existing concerns and obtain a wider basis of 
agreement.5 
Be that as it may, the moment when the presidency gets a sufficient majority in the Council 
represents a turning point in the negotiations. Up until then, the presidency focuses on getting 
the necessary support to adopt the measures. The stronger the weight of a member state, the 
more it counts and the more leverage it can exert to influence the outcome. The presidency 
and the national delegations themselves constantly keep track of how the majorities are 
moving, especially in the meetings of COREPER I and the related Council configurations 
mostly dealing with EU internal policies.6 The process is slightly more informal at the level of 
working party, but most co-decision dossiers reach the COREPER level for negotiations with 
the European Parliament. Therefore, voting rules matter and their change may affect the 
balance of power in the Council.  
All in all, Article 3 of the Protocol (No. 36) on transitional provisions established that until 31 
March 2017, any member of the Council may request the application of Nice rules when voting 
an act by QMV. In practice, this provision will oblige the Presidency of the Council – and the 
national delegations – to keep its counting according to both systems.  
During the recent negotiations to amend the Council’s rules of procedure to include the double 
majority system and the reference population figures, a number of member states adamantly 
insisted that the amendment should also mention the possibility to vote under the previous 
system.7 This anecdote testifies to the intention on the part of some member states to keep Nice 
alive, as already demonstrated in the Council on Employment and Social Policy. In recent 
deliberations on the general approach to the Proposal for a Directive on improving the gender 
balance among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges and related 
measures, Hungary requested the application of the old rules – although it eventually failed 
to forge a blocking minority.  
The new QMV system will do away with the protracted negotiations to reallocate voting 
weights among member states and to redefine the new thresholds accordingly. But whether it 
will substantially improve democratic legitimacy and efficiency in the Council as intended is 
a more controversial issue.  
 
                                                   
5 After 31 March 2017, this will require at least 55% of the population or 55% of the number of member 
states necessary to constitute a blocking minority. See Council Decision 2009/857/EC relating to the 
implementation of Article 16.4 TEU and Article 238.2 TFEU.  
6 COREPER is the Council's main preparatory body composed of the 'permanent representatives' from 
each member state. COREPER I prepares the work of six Council configurations: Agriculture and 
fisheries (only in part); Competitiveness; Education, youth, culture and sport; Employment, social 
policy, health and consumer affairs; Environment; and Transport, telecommunications and energy. 
COREPER II prepares the work of the Council meetings on Economic and financial affairs; Foreign 
affairs; General affairs; and Justice and home affairs. 
7 Council Decision of 29 September of 2014 amending the Council’s Rules of Procedure.  
